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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although philanthropy ranks among the best of human endeavors, local 
governments across the country have severely restricted charitable entreaties by 
organizations and individuals alike, all in the name of eliminating “panhandlers.” 
These laws rely on premises that increasingly conflict with Supreme Court 
instructions about the freedom of speech. Yet lingering uncertainty about where 
exactly charitable restrictions fall in First Amendment jurisprudence has 
encouraged local governments to innovate new statutory formulations to wage 
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war on expressions of poverty in order to “clean up” their cities.1 This piece 
examines seven arguments commonly used to justify restrictions on charitable 
solicitations and finds them to be without Constitutional merit. The First 
Amendment firmly and emphatically protects requests for altruism. 
Local efforts to eradicate panhandling vary dramatically across the nation, 
but there are a few common themes.2 To begin, local governments expansively 
define “panhandling” to include any solicitation by an individual or an 
organization for an immediate donation without offering something of equivalent 
value in exchange.3 Some local governments prohibit such solicitation in groups 
of two or more or on sidewalks within a buffer zone around certain areas, such as 
near sports stadiums, bus stops, streets, or commercial establishments.4 Other 
local governments require registration before solicitation can begin, and bar those 
with certain minor convictions from obtaining registration.5 Given their doubtful 
premises and the strong Constitutional protection given to pleas for altruism, all 
of these efforts to reduce panhandling stand on constitutionally perilous grounds. 
II. MISTAKEN ARGUMENT #1: THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT APPLY 
BECAUSE ASKING FOR MONEY IS CONDUCT, NOT SPEECH 
Although a favorite by governments and scholars,6 this argument need not 
detain us for long. Conceptually, it is difficult to imagine how speaking the 
words “I’m hungry, please help” is not actually speech. And, indeed, little 
judicial authority supports this view. Even symbolic speech such as burning the 
American flag receives constitutional protection,7 and the Supreme Court has 
                                                                                                                         
 1 NAT’L LAW CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, NO SAFE PLACE: THE 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES, 20–21 (2014) (finding a twenty-five 
percent increase in city-wide anti-begging laws since 2011). 
 2 The most egregious laws ban panhandling everywhere in the city. E.g., YOUNGSTOWN, 
OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 509.08(a) (Walter H. Drane Co. through Mar. 4, 2015). Since 
flat bans on speech are almost never upheld, these laws stand little chance of surviving 
judicial scrutiny and will not be discussed further. E.g., Speet v. Schuette, 726 F.3d 867, 875 
(6th Cir. 2013). 
 3 Many laws across the country borrow language found in a model ordinance proposed 
by one advocacy organization. KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER, RESTORING PUBLIC ORDER: A GUIDE 
TO REGULATING PANHANDLING 27–33 (1993) (published by the Criminal Justice Legal 
Foundation). 
 4 E.g., SUMMIT COUNTY, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES § 537.15(c) (Walter H. Drane 
Co. through Aug. 31, 2015). 
 5 See SCHEIDEGGER, supra note 3, at 32–33. 
 6 Speet, 726 F.3d at 873–74 (noting this was the primary argument of the Michigan 
Attorney General in defense of Michigan’s ban on “begging”); Fay Leoussis, The New 
Constitutional Right to Beg—Is Begging Really Protected Speech?, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 529, 530 (1995). 
 7 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989). 
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repeatedly and consistently found that monetary solicitations are protected 
speech.8 
One decision, not even followed within its circuit,9 concluded that only 
charities—not individuals—have the right to ask for money.10 This startling 
approach would give more speech rights to artificial corporations than to citizens. 
To the contrary, it is well established that people have the right to associate and 
the right not to associate:11 the government cannot compel association as a 
prerequisite to exercising freedom of speech. Decades of subsequent cases—
including an April ruling where eight Supreme Court justices agreed that a 
restriction on an individual’s requests for donations were subject to strict 
scrutiny—leave no question that the individual’s right to communicate a request 
for money is fully protected by the First Amendment.12 
III. MISTAKEN ARGUMENT #2: RESTRICTIONS ON CHARITABLE REQUESTS 
ARE CONTENT NEUTRAL 
Under the First Amendment, efforts to regulate speech on the basis of its 
content are sharply disfavored and rarely survive judicial challenge. Reasonable 
restrictions of speech that are not based on content are still scrutinized, but are 
more likely to survive. Given this context, a popular approach among local 
governments is to write their laws with an effort to sweep broadly, under the 
counterintuitive rationale that they can mitigate First Amendment problems with 
their laws by restricting more speech.13 Thus, the text of many laws restrict all 
requests for donations, be it by the food bank, the politician running for office, or 
the hungry looking for a meal. 
Whether the breadth of these laws makes them content neutral on their face 
has sharply divided courts.14 The Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits readily 
concluded that laws targeting requests for donations were facially content based, 
since whether a restriction applied depended on the words being spoken.15 
Meanwhile, the First and the Seventh Circuits (in decisions now vacated) found 
that breadth was a virtue, and since the laws applied to non-commercial 
solicitations of all stripes, whether charitable, political, or personal, they were 
                                                                                                                         
 8 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 790–91 (1988) 
(collecting cases). 
 9 Loper v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 10 Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 156 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 11 Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014). 
 12 Williams–Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1664–65 (2015). 
 13 SCHEIDEGGER, supra note 3, at 7. 
 14 Clay Calvert, Content-Based Confusion and Panhandling: Muddling a Weathered 
First Amendment Doctrine Takes Its Toll on Society’s Less Fortunate, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. 
INT. 249, 250 (2015), http://rjolpi.richmond.edu/archive/Calvert_Formatted.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/2TU6-DXTC]. 
 15 ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 466 F.3d 784, 784 (9th Cir. 2006); Clatterbuck v. City of 
Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2013); Planet Aid v. City of St. Johns, 782 F.3d 
318, 328 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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content neutral.16 In a refreshing display of judicial modesty, the Seventh Circuit 
panel conceded: “We do not profess certainty about our conclusion that the 
ordinance is content-neutral.”17 
This disagreement was, perhaps, to be expected, since the Supreme Court’s 
instructions were not always consistent. In one decision, for example, the Court 
explained that “[t]he government’s purpose is the controlling consideration,” and 
thus if a state restriction was “‘justified without reference to the content of the 
regulated speech,’” it was content neutral.18 Relying on this approach, in a now-
vacated opinion, the First Circuit upheld panhandling restrictions because the city 
had pointed to justifications such as public safety that, on its face, had nothing to 
do with content.19 
There is reason to doubt the First Circuit’s conclusion, even under the test 
that it used. As noted below, a primary justification for restrictions on charitable 
solicitation is to prevent a perceived unpleasantness felt by the listener, and this 
unconstitutional motive moves these laws towards content-based restrictions.20 
Further, although the laws define panhandling more broadly than the traditional 
definition,21 the very use of the word “panhandling” lays bare the legislative 
purpose. Any doubt on this score is dispelled by the rhetoric of the government 
officials who pass these laws, who often candidly express their hope that these 
laws would rid their cities of the downtrodden asking for money.22 Even when 
government officials are coached to avoid such transparency, pretext is usually 
not hard to find. Moreover, many laws are not actually being enforced as broadly 
as written, as food banks, firefighters, and trick-or-treaters are permitted to solicit 
openly for their causes without being hauled off to jail.23 
In any event, the test for content neutrality was clarified by the Supreme 
Court in June, and it was bad news for panhandling restrictions. In Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert, the Court instructed that a law is content based if either of the 
following are true: (1) the text of the law makes distinctions based on speech’s 
                                                                                                                         
 16 Thayer v. City of Worcester, 755 F.3d 60 (1st Cir. 2014), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2887 
(2015); Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 717 (7th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g, No. 
13-3581, 2015 WL 4714073, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 2015). 
 17 Norton, 768 F.3d at 717. 
 18 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). 
19 Thayer, 755 F.3d at 64. 
 20 See supra text accompanying notes 35–37. 
 21 See Panhandling, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining the word as 
“[t]he act or practice of approaching or stopping strangers and begging for money or food”). 
 22 Scott Piepho, Are Fairlawn’s Panhandling Regulations Constitutional?, AKRON 
LEGAL NEWS (May 2, 2012), http://www.akronlegalnews.com/editorial/3621 [http://perma.cc/ 
7TVT-FBPX]; Associated Press, ‘No-Panhandling’ Sign Offends Man, VINDY.COM (Jan. 18, 
2015), http://www.vindy.com/news/2015/jan/18/no-panhandling-sign-offends-man/ [http:// 
perma.cc/YEP8-HH5Z] (quoting the Mayor of Whitehall, Ohio: “That’s one of the first things 
I heard when I became mayor: ‘I’m getting panhandled, it’s everywhere, it needs to stop.’”). 
 23 Leigh Allan, It’s a Sign for Dayton to Beg Off, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 13, 2004, 
at B1. 
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“subject matter . . . function or purpose”24 or (2) the purpose behind the law 
suggests it was “adopted by the government ‘because of disagreement with the 
message [the speech] conveys,’”25 either because of a censorial motive or the 
absence of any non-censorial justification that would explain the distinctions 
made. Thus, even when the government asserts a benign motive, laws that draw 
distinction on their face “based on the message a speaker conveys” must pass 
strict scrutiny.26 Applying this rule, the Court found that a city’s sign ordinance 
that imposed different size and timing limitations on “directional signs” than on 
“political signs” and “ideological signs” was a content-based regulation that 
could not survive strict scrutiny.27 
Under the Court’s approach in Reed, panhandling restrictions readily qualify 
as content-based rules that must pass strict scrutiny. By imposing particular 
burdens on speech made with “the purpose[] of immediately obtaining money or 
any other thing of value,”28 panhandling restrictions on their face draw 
distinctions between speech based on its “subject matter, . . . function or 
purpose.”29 No inquiry into the law’s motive or purpose is needed; one need only 
read the text of the ordinances to conclude that strict scrutiny applies, which 
“almost assuredly dooms them to failure.”30 Indeed, Reed compelled the Seventh 
Circuit to reverse course completely: the same panel that had previously upheld 
restrictions on panhandling now concluded that the restrictions violated the First 
Amendment.31 
IV. MISTAKEN ARGUMENT #3: RESTRICTIONS LIKE BUFFER ZONES ARE 
REASONABLE TIME, PLACE, MANNER CONDITIONS 
While a content-based panhandling law will not survive, the inverse is not 
necessarily true. Speech restrictions on sidewalks and parks face a presumption 
of unconstitutionality that can be overcome only if they are content neutral, leave 
effective alternatives for the speech, and are backed by actual evidence that the 
zones are narrowly tailored to further a legitimate, non-censorial purpose.32 Even 
under this more forgiving content-neutral standard, local governments have 
                                                                                                                         
 24 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015). 
 25 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
(1989)). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 DAYTON, OHIO, REVISED CODE OF GENERAL ORDINANCES § 137.14 (Municode 
through Ordinance No. 31389-15). 
 29 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 30 Calvert, supra note 14, at 280. 
 31 Norton v. City of Springfield, No. 13-3581, 2015 WL 4714073, at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 7, 
2015). 
 32 Reynolds v. Middleton, 779 F.3d 222, 225–26 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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struggled to show that sidewalk speech restrictions are narrowly tailored.33 For 
example, the Supreme Court recently and unanimously rejected a Massachusetts 
law establishing buffer zones on the sidewalks around abortion clinics.34 Even 
after narrowly concluding that these zones were content neutral, the Supreme 
Court still found that government had failed to prove that 35 foot buffer zones at 
every clinic were sufficiently tailored to fulfill the government’s interests in 
preventing intimidation and congestion, or that the speakers who wish to 
converse with those entering the clinics had an effective means of doing so.35 A 
similar fate likely awaits buffer zones in the solicitation context, which are 
supported by pretext rather than evidence, and that regularly fail to leave 
alternatives available to the speaker.36 Likewise, prohibitions on charitable 
solicitation by a group of two or more (entitled, in the great legislative tradition 
of doublespeak, “aggressive” panhandling) violate not only speech rights but 
association and assembly rights as well, giving courts a trifecta of First 
Amendment violations from which to choose. 
V. MISTAKEN ARGUMENT #4: WE NEED TO LIMIT PANHANDLING  
TO MAKE OUR CITIES MORE ATTRACTIVE37 
Cities are wonderful places of ideas and excitement, and the desirability of a 
walkable city is widely acknowledged. One commonly voiced concern is that 
people feel uncomfortable being confronted with requests by those perceived to 
be in extreme poverty, and limiting solicitation will encourage more downtown 
visitors or residents.38 A more offensive and less persuasive iteration of this 
argument—and one that seems to carry more purchase in those sprawling 
suburbs “specifically designed with malice toward pedestrian traffic”39—relies 
on a claimed governmental interest in “maintain[ing] the quality of the . . . visitor 
environment,”40 which amounts to nothing more than a desire to spare passersby 
the unpleasantness of hearing or seeing a request for help.41  
                                                                                                                         
 33 Id. at 226, 228–29 (assuming law was content neutral based on pro se litigant’s 
concession, but expressing skepticism that restrictions on roadside solicitations would survive 
following McCullen). 
 34 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2541 (2014). 
 35 Id. at 2537. 
 36 Reynolds, 779 F.3d at 231. 
 37 Robert Teir, Maintaining Safety and Civility in Public Spaces: A Constitutional 
Approach to Aggressive Begging, 54 LA. L. REV. 285, 289 (1993). 
 38 Dan Frosch, Homeless Are Fighting Back Against Panhandling Bans, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/06/Commerce Clausehomeless-are-fighting-
back-in-court-against-panhandling-bans.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/LTK4-9PTC] (quoting a 
City Attorney who reasoned that “the persistent sort of solicitation by people who just camp 
out in front of stores every day downtown has really discouraged tourists, shoppers and 
families from coming downtown”). 
 39 Piepho, supra note 22. 
 40 Press Release, City of Dayton, Ohio, Amended Ordinance Redefines Means of 
Panhandling (June 22, 2011), http://www.daytonohio.gov/PressReleases/Documents/ 
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Yet freedom of speech belongs to the rich and poor alike. The cruel reality of 
restrictions on charitable solicitation is that they place the comfort and 
convenience of relatively wealthy visitors and business-owners over the First 
Amendment rights of the destitute.42 Whether the community likes the speech or 
the speaker is entirely beside the point, and the fact that people would rather not 
hear speech or find it unpleasant is no justification for limiting it.  In fact, “the 
First Amendment protects flag burning, funeral protests, and Nazi parades—
despite the profound offense such spectacles cause.”43 And, as the Supreme 
Court recently explained, the fact that an “individual confronted with an 
uncomfortable message” on a sidewalk cannot “turn the page, change the 
channel, or leave the Web site” is a “virtue, not a vice.”44 Thus, the most 
common justification for banning solicitation—that people want to avoid hearing 
it—actually supplies the strongest argument that such laws are unconstitutional 
efforts to censor undesired speech.45 
VI. MISTAKEN ARGUMENT #5: PANHANDLING LEADS TO INTIMIDATION 
WHERE PEOPLE FEEL LIKE THEY CANNOT SAY NO46 
The First Amendment allows for regulation of “true threats.”47 It does not 
                                                                                                                         
2011/Amended%20Ordinance%20Redefines%20Means%20of%20Panhandling.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/V7EX-J2LB]; see also Piepho, supra note 22 (quoting Fairlawn Council Member 
Kathleen Baum as saying the new restrictions “[w]ill deter people from panhandling. It gives 
the city a better appearance.”) (alteration in original); Sanford, Fla., Ordinance No. 2014-4324 
(Sept. 8, 2014) (asserting an interest in providing a “pleasant environment” to justify the 
adoption of the “Aggressive Panhandling” ordinance). 
 41 Susan Schweik, Kicked to the Curb: Ugly Law Then and Now, 46 HARV. C.R-C.L L. 
REV. AMICUS 1, 2 (2011), http://harvardcrcl.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Schweik_ 
Vol46_Amicus.pdf [http://perma.cc/22VB-7RT9]. 
 42 Business associations are commonly the fiercest advocates for anti-panhandling laws. 
E.g., Catherine Doe, Downtown Alliance Confronts Pan Handling, VALLEY VOICE  
(Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.ourvalleyvoice.com/2013/09/18/downtown-alliance-confronts-
pan-handling/ [http://perma.cc/4VXN-MJS4] (quoting the leader of a business alliance saying: 
“We’ve worked too long and too hard to make downtown the positive place it is and will 
throw every legal means possible to deal with it. We aren’t going to let the homeless change 
that.”). 
 43 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014). 
 44 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518,  2529 (2014). 
 45 Id. at 2531–32 (“To be clear, the Act would not be content neutral if it were concerned 
with undesirable effects that arise from ‘the direct impact of speech on its audience’ or 
‘[l]isteners’ reactions to speech.’ If, for example, the speech outside Massachusetts abortion 
clinics caused offense or made listeners uncomfortable, such offense or discomfort would not 
give the Commonwealth a content-neutral justification to restrict the speech.”) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
 46 William L. Mitchell, II, “Secondary Effects” Analysis: A Balanced Approach to the 
Problem of Prohibitions on Aggressive Panhandling, 24 U. BALT. L. REV. 291, 294 (1995). 
 47 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“‘True threats’ encompass those 
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”). 
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permit inferring a threat, and it certainly does not permit inferring a threat simply 
because some people feel intimidated when approached by someone who is 
different than they are. Indeed, rather than succumbing to imagined threats, most 
people tend to ignore panhandlers who appear to be homeless.48 Behavior that is 
actually threatening—not merely annoying or obnoxious, and not simply because 
they make the listener feel guilty or uncomfortable—can be limited without 
restricting an entire category of speakers from a public forum.49 In light of the 
First Amendment values at stake, local governments will need much stronger 
evidence than broad stereotypes and anecdotal evidence to impute intimidation to 
the entire category of speakers. 
VII. MISTAKEN ARGUMENT #6: PEOPLE WHO PANHANDLE USE  
THE MONEY FOR DRUGS AND ALCOHOL50 
A common refrain is that people should not support panhandlers because 
many of them are not actually homeless or will use the money for “improper” 
purposes. Whether this is empirically true or not is up for debate, but it is beside 
the Constitutional point. Similarly irrelevant is the government’s paternalistic 
view that it is wiser to donate to organized charities.51 No one is required to 
donate to charity or to individuals, but by allowing all voices into the 
marketplace of ideas, the First Amendment entrusts citizens—and not their 
government—with the choice to decide which causes to heed and which requests 
to answer.52 Just as listeners can choose whether or not to support charities that 
spend an “unreasonable” amount on fundraising,53 listeners can decide for 
themselves whether to respond to a sidewalk plea for assistance. 
A variation on this argument is that we need limits on panhandling to prevent 
charlatans from lying to obtain a donation. This line of reasoning rests upon an 
untested but widely believed assumption that some of those who panhandle 
invent a sympathetic story to encourage donations. Not only does this fail for 
                                                                                                                         
 48 One formerly homeless person explained: “Panhandling sucks. It’s just hard. You have 
to take so much rejection . . . An overwhelming majority of people that walk past panhandlers 
ignore them or say something rude or look at them like they’re scum.” Alyssa Figueroa, Do 
You Ignore Homeless People?, ALTERNET (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/ 
poverty/psychology-behind-why-people-react-way-they-do-homeless-person-asking-help [http:// 
perma.cc/RY5Z-7TD5]. 
 49 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that 
“political hyperbole” and language that is “vituperative, abusive, and inexact” do not 
constitute true threats). 
 50 Doe, supra note 42. 
 51 Piepho, supra note 22 (quoting a City Council President saying: “I’ve always been of 
the belief that if you want to give, give to a charity, not the people on the streets.”). 
 52 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 
(1976) (“[P]eople will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, 
and . . . the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to 
close them.”). 
 53 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S 781, 791–95 (1988). 
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want of evidence, the best way to fight fraud is to ban fraud, not to expansively 
restrict an entire class of speech. As the Supreme Court has said: “If this is not 
the most efficient means of preventing fraud, we reaffirm simply and 
emphatically that the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice 
speech for efficiency.”54 
VIII. MISTAKEN ARGUMENT #7: THE SUPREME COURT HAS  
ALREADY AUTHORIZED PRE-REGISTRATION PERMITTING  
REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL SOLICITORS 
The latest fad among local governments is to deter soliciting by requiring 
that they obtain a registration from the city before hitting the streets.55 These 
laws run up against a presumption of unconstitutionality: 
It is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to 
the very notion of a free society—that in the context of everyday public 
discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her 
neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so.56 
Although the Court has suggested that, in light of the privacy interests of the 
home, the government may impose minimal, ministerial, and quick registration 
requirements upon door-to-door solicitors in some circumstances,57 lower courts 
have refused to extend this exception to a speaker’s access to a public forum like 
a sidewalk, where the government’s interest in protecting private home life does 
not apply.58 Moreover, pre-speech licensing requirements by their nature inhibit 
spontaneous speech (as in, for example, the person who truly needs bus fare to 
get home), which enjoys particular protection in the public square.59 The right to 
speak is not a privilege granted by local ordinance, but a right bestowed by the 
                                                                                                                         
 54 Id. at 795. 
 55 E.g., AKRON, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 135.10(F) (Municode through Ordinance 
No. 95-2015). 
 56 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–
66 (2002). 
 57 Id. at 162–63. 
 58 Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1039 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“It is 
therefore not surprising that we and almost every other circuit to have considered the issue 
have refused to uphold registration requirements that apply to individual speakers or small 
groups in a public forum.”). 
 59 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 162. Recognizing this problem, even the model ordinance on 
which these laws recommends that licenses should be required only for those who panhandle 
five or more days in a year. SCHEIDEGGER, supra note 3, at 31. Local governments have gone 
beyond this recommendation to require registration before any solicitation could take place. 
E.g., AKRON, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES § 135.10(F) (Municode through Ordinance No. 95-
2015). Also problematic are rules that effectively bar those with minor misdemeanor 
convictions from obtaining a permit, since misdemeanants do not forfeit their right to free 
speech. E.g., id. 
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Constitution. Given the history of and potential for abuse, courts are 
appropriately skeptical of local efforts to impose a government official between 
citizens and their First Amendment rights.60 
X. CONCLUSION 
The great power of our nation’s commitment to freedom of speech is that it 
applies to us all: wealthy or not, eloquent or not, likeable or not. Charitable 
requests fall comfortably within the First Amendment’s inclusive protections, 
denying governments the option to drive speech or speakers from the public 
square based on community opposition or reaction to their speech. Genuine, non-
censorial efforts to eliminate threats and fraud must rely on narrowly tailored, 
evidence-backed rules, not broad strokes based on stereotypes and stories. The 
First Amendment does not demand generosity, but it does protect the right to ask 
for it. 
                                                                                                                         
 60 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 167. 
